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Abstract
This paper provides evidence for the size of ﬁring costs for eight countries. In contrast to the
existing literature, we use the optimality conditions obtained in a search and matching model
to ﬁnd a reduced form equation for ﬁring costs. We ﬁnd that our estimates are slightly larger
compared with other studies. Finally, we oﬀer three explanations for the observed cross-country
patterns.
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1 Introduction
The eﬀects of ﬁring costs on welfare (e.g. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) or Alvarez and Veracierto
(1998)) and business cycle dynamics (e.g. Veracierto (2008) or Lechthaler et al. (2010)) have been
studied in great detail. However, there is a fundamental challenge in calibrating and, therefore,
applying dynamic models with ﬁring costs: how large are they?
Garibaldi and Violante (2005) show that layoﬀ costs have two components, (i) transfers from
ﬁrm to worker and (ii) a tax that is paid outside the ﬁrm-worker pair. While there is evidence on
the size of severance payments (i) for a number of countries, ﬁring costs (i+ii) additionally contain
administrative and procedural costs and, therefore, are hard to estimate.
For severance payments, Cozzi et al. (2010) show that there is sizable variation across countries.
For example, in Italy severance payments equal 20 monthly wages, while they equal 1.2 monthly
wages in the United Kingdom. For ﬁring costs, the literature uses diﬀerent approaches. Abowd
and Kramarz (2003) use establishment data for French ﬁrms and a statistical model to estimate
hiring and ﬁring costs. They ﬁnd that ﬁring costs are a increasing and concave function in the
number of layoﬀs with a large ﬁxed component. Further, Dolﬁn (2006) uses ﬁrm-level data for the
United States from the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project. She ﬁnds that the costs of
ﬁring documentation have signiﬁcant eﬀects on turnover, vacancies, hours, and number of workers.
Often, one relies on the estimates of Bentolila and Bertola (1990). Besides the fact that the
paper is 23 years old, the authors use an ad hoc equation for expected dismissal costs. They ﬁnd
that the value of ﬁring costs in the UK is 25 percent of annual wages, while it is 75 percent of
annual wages in Germany (on an annual basis).1
This paper uses a diﬀerent approach to ﬁnd a value for ﬁring costs in search and matching
models. We follow the contribution by Burnside et al. (1993): they use the model’s optimality
conditions to derive a reduced form equation describing the evolution of eﬀort over the cycle. To
determine the value of ﬁring costs we use the optimality condition for job creation from a standard
search and matching model with ﬁring costs. At this point it should be noted that we use highly
aggregated data to obtain a value for the ﬁring costs and, therefore, disregard the fact that ﬁring
cost vary across workers, shown by Dolado et al. (2005, 2007). Hence, we interpret the result as
an economy-wide average value of ﬁring costs.
Finally, using data for eight countries, we provide a cross-country analysis of ﬁring costs and
present three explanations for the observed patterns.
2 Reduced Form Equation
We assume that the good market is perfectly competitive, while the labor market is imperfect due
to the assumption of search and matching frictions. Trade in the labor market is uncoordinated,
costly, and time-consuming. Search takes place on a discrete and closed market. Workers can be
1A diﬀerent approach is to make ﬁring costs proportional to productivity. However, this is just a transformation
from an estimate for the share of ﬁring costs from wages to the share from productivity.
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either employed or unemployed, such that there is no out of labor force option. Similarly, each
ﬁrm has one job that is either ﬁlled, or vacant. If the job is ﬁlled, it is subject to the time-varying
probability of being exogenously destroyed, ρt > 0. Firms create jobs at the rate M (Ut, Vt) at the
non-state-contingent cost of c > 0 units of output per vacancy, where M (·) is the homogeneous-of-
degree-one-matching-function,
M (Ut, Vt) = mU
µ
t V
1−µ
t , (1)
wherem > 0 gives the match eﬃciency, µ > 0 is the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to unemployment and Vt is the vacancy rate.
The vacancy-to-unemployment ratio
θt =
Vt
Ut
, (2)
reﬂects labor market tightness. Then, the vacancy ﬁlling probability is q (θt) = M (Ut, Vt) /Vt =
m (Ut/Vt)
µ. Combining entry and exit deﬁnitions yields the evolution of employment which states
that employment today will be driven by the number of non-separated workers from the last period
and the non-destroyed matches from the last period. Along this line, the evolution of aggregate
unemployment can be written as Ut = 1−Nt.
We assume the existence of a representative ﬁrm that solves its proﬁt maximization problem
max
{Nt,Vt}
Et
∞
t=0
βtλt [Yt −WtNt − cVt − ρtNtΓt] , (3)
subject to the evolution of employment
Nt = (1− ρt) (Nt−1 +Mt−1) , (4)
and the production function
Yt = ZtNt. (5)
Here, Zt is a Hicks-neutral aggregate technology shock.
The second term in parenthesis gives total wage costs. The third term reﬂects total vacancy
posting costs and ﬁring costs Γt ≥ 0, for all separated workers.
Finally, the FONCs are
∂N t : τ t =
Yt
Nt
−Wt + (1− ρt)Et

βt+1τ t+1

− ρtΓt, (6)
∂V t : c = (1− ρt)q(θt)Et

βt+1τ t+1

, (7)
where βt+1 = β
λt+1
λt
is the stochastic discount factor and τ t is the multiplier on the evolution
of employment. Assuming a logarithmic utility function in consumption the marginal utility of
consumption, λt, is
λt =
1
Ct
. (8)
Using the FONCs gives the optimality condition for job creation
c
q(θt)
= Et

(1− ρt)βt+1

Yt+1
Nt+1
−Wt+1 +
c
q(θt+1)
− ρtΓt

. (9)
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The left-hand side of this equation gives the (time-varying) hiring costs which equal the beneﬁts
of creating a new job. The latter depends on the marginal product of labor depleted by the wage
and increased by saved hiring costs in the next period in case of non-separation.
Solving this equation for Γt gives
Γt = Et

1
ρt

Yt+1
Nt+1
−Wt+1 +
c
q(θt+1)
−
c
(1− ρt)βt+1q(θt)

. (10)
In principal, we can use this equation to back out the value of ﬁring costs. However, often one
assumes that ﬁring costs are proportional to the wage and we therefore assume
Γt = γtWt. (11)
Then, (10) reads as
γt = Et

1
ρtWt

Yt+1
Nt+1
−Wt+1 +
c
q(θt+1)
−
c
(1− ρt)βt+1q(θt)

, (12)
= Et

 1ρtWt

 Yt+1
Nt+1
−Wt+1 +
c
m

Ut+1
Vt+1
µ − c
(1− ρt)β
Ct
Ct+1
m

Ut
Vt
µ



 . (13)
3 Data
In order to compute ﬁring costs using equation (13) we need the following time series: output,
employment, unemployment, wages, vacancies, and consumption.
Time series for the United States are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. For the seven European countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary,
Poland, Portugal, and UK) time series are taken from Eurostat and the OECD.2 We use seasonally
adjusted, quarterly data from 2001:Q1 to 2012:Q2.3 Time series for output, consumption, and
wages are detrended using the GDP deﬂator.
Finally, we also use a time series for the separation rate but, due to data limitation, only for
the United States. For the remaining seven countries we take the individual separation rates from
the estimates by Hobijn and Sahin (2009). The only exception is Austria, for which no estimate is
presented in Hobijn and Sahin (2009). We assume a value of four percent which is an intermediate
value across all estimates.
Before we present the estimation results, we need to calibrate the following parameters: the
match eﬃciencym, vacancy posting costs c, the discount factor β, and the elasticity of the matching
function µ. The discount factor is set to 0.99 as common in the literature. Match eﬃciency is set
to a value of 0.7 which is a value usually obtained in search and matching models. We assume that
the elasticity of the matching function is 0.4 as usual in the literature. Finally, vacancy posting
costs are taken from the steady state and are equal to 0.06.
2The dataset as well as the estimation codes are available upon request.
3The limiting factor here is data for vacancies.
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Finally, in order to put our results into perspective, we use data on the strictness of employment
protection legislation (overall and for temporary employment), spending and participation in active
labor market programs, and union density all obtained from the OECD database.
4 Results
Figures 1 and 2 present the estimated values of ﬁring costs as a share of quarterly wages (within
each quarter) over the 2001:Q1 to 2012:Q2 period. For simplicity, we disregard the expectation
operator in the estimation. Further, table 1 shows the average ﬁring cost value over the sample
period.
Table 1: Average ﬁring costs.
Country mean(γt)
USA 0.3
UK 0.31
Austria 0.38
Czech Republic 0.78
Finland 0.37
Hungary 0.61
Poland 0.72
Portugal 0.55
For the United States we obtain a value of 0.3 over the entire sample. The graph shows that
ﬁring costs increase at the beginning of our sample, remained almost constant at a value of roughly
0.3 and in 2009 increased to a value of 0.32. Here, one might interpret this increase with the
ﬁnancial crisis triggering a large recession increasing the cost of ﬁring a worker.
The estimated series for the UK shares the initial upward trend that we observed for the United
States. This trend continues until the end of 2006 when a slight downward trend until 2009 kicks
in. About one year later compared the US a positive upward shift is visible. On average we ﬁnd a
value of 0.31 for the UK.
For Austria, the time series for ﬁring costs shows a slight upward trend up to the end of 2007.
This upward trend is followed by a signiﬁcant drop of ﬁring costs from 0.4 to 0.35. At the end of
our sample we ﬁnd that ﬁring costs tend to increase. Overall, we ﬁnd an average value of 0.38 for
ﬁring costs in Austria.
In contrast to the upward trends we observed before, Finland shows a slight downward trend
from the beginning of our sample. This downward trend becomes even steeper from the ﬁrst quarter
of 2007 on, decreasing from 0.42 to 0.32. This negative trend continues until the beginning of 2009,
when ﬁring costs stabilize around a value of 0.35. In summation, the mean value of ﬁring costs for
Finland is 0.37.
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Figure 1: Firing costs over the cycle.
Turning to the countries in Figure 2, we ﬁnd that ﬁring costs in Hungary reveal a slight down-
ward trend from 0.65 to 0.57 at the end of our sample period. On average, ﬁring costs equal 0.61.
A similar pattern is obtained for the Czech republic. Starting from a level of roughly 0.8 ﬁring costs
decrease over the entire sample to reach a value of almost 0.73 at the end of our sample. The mean
value of ﬁring costs for the Czech republic is equal to 0.78. Very small deviations in ﬁring costs are
obtained for Portugal. Here, ﬁring costs show little variation and stay close to the mean value of
0.55 over the entire sample. Only towards the end of the sample we observe a strong upward trend.
Finally, the estimated time series for Poland shows much more variation as the other time series.
We observe a sharp upward trend at the beginning of the sample period that continues until 2005.
Then, for roughly three years ﬁring costs stay put at a level of 0.77, before they decrease and
stabilize around a level of about 0.7. On average, ﬁring costs in Poland equal 0.72.
5 Robustness
In this section we want to provide a robustness check for the United States. Since we have a time
series for the separation rate for the United States, we want to compare our ﬁring cost time series
computed using a ﬁx separation rate of 3.18 percent and the observed time series. Figure 3 presents
the time series for the US ﬁring costs. The ﬁgure shows that our interpretation as an upper bound
seems reasonable. The two time series share the same trends over the entire time span. We observe
an upward trend at the beginning of the sample until the mid-2003’s. Then, from 2004 to 2007
we ﬁnd little variation in the value until 2008, when a upward shift becomes visible. As pointed
out, the time series with the ﬁxed separation rate is signiﬁcantly above the time series with the
observed time series. Until 2009 the diﬀerence is stable at roughly six percentage points. After the
level shift of 2009 the variable time series is above the ﬁx time series, while the diﬀerence is much
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Figure 2: Firing costs over the cycle.
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Figure 3: Robustness check for the United States.
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smaller at a value of about two percentage points.
6 Explaining the Results
After describing our results, we want to test and discuss several explanations for the observed
patterns. Of course, this regression suﬀers from the limited number of observations such that we
should be careful in interpreting the results.
First, let us begin with discussing the relation between ﬁring costs and potential explanatory
variables. Employment protection legislation (EPL, for short). One would expect that countries
with a c.p. stricter EPL would feature a high value of ﬁring costs. Furthermore, spending and par-
ticipation in active labor market programs (ALMP, for short) varies signiﬁcantly across countries.
As those ALMP programs aﬀect the incentives and the skill level of (unemployed) workers, there
might be a relation between the cost of ﬁring a worker and ALMP. Finally, a higher union density
might increase the costs of ﬁring a worker.
Table 2: Firing Cost Regression. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗: 10 % level, ∗∗: 5 % level, ∗∗∗: 1 % level.
Mixed is cubi for EPL and union density and quadratic for ALMP.
Parameter Linear Quadratic Cubic Mixed
Constant 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
EPL 0.06∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗∗
ALMP -0.05 -0.03 -0.02∗ -0.05∗
Union Density -0.0002 0 0 0
LLN 11.36 10.98 10.93 10.9
Table 2 summarizes our OLS estimation results. We show four diﬀerent speciﬁcations: a linear
model, two models with a quadratic and a cubic non-linearity and a mixed model with a cubic
eﬀect of EPL and union density and a quadratic relation for ALMP.
The resulting coeﬃcient for EPL is positive and is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Its value
varies between 0.06 as an upper bound and 0.01 as a lower bound. Second, the regression coeﬃcient
of ﬁring costs on spending as percentage of GDP we ﬁnd a coeﬃcient varying between -0.05 and
-0.02. The coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, once we allow for a cubic relationship
and insigniﬁcant in the linear and quadratic scenarios. Finally, the coeﬃcient on union density is
insigniﬁcant in all considered cases.
We can draw the conclusion that in our limited sample (i) non-linear eﬀects exist and (ii) that
EPL and active labor market programs do have a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁring costs.
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7 Final Remarks
This study is concerned with providing cross-country evidence for the value of ﬁring costs in order
to calibrate state-of-the-art search and matching models with labor turnover costs. In contrast
to existing studies, we use the approach pursued by Burnside et al. (1993) and use optimality
conditions to ﬁnd a reduce form equation for the share of ﬁring costs from wages.
Using time series for eight diﬀerent countries, we estimate the value of ﬁring costs across our
sample period from 2001 to 2012. We ﬁnd that ﬁring costs vary signiﬁcantly across countries.
The lowest values are obtained for the UK (31 percent of quarterly wages) and the United States
(3 percent of quarterly wages). On the other side of the spectrum, Poland (0.72) and the Czech
republic (0.78) show the largest values of ﬁring costs. If we compare our results with the existing
values used in the literature, we ﬁnd that for most countries they are larger compared with the
existing literature. However, for the United States the value of roughly one third of quarterly
wages seems to be in line with the usual values found in the literature. Further, we oﬀer three
explanations for the observed diﬀerences across countries. In summation, strictness of employment
protection and active labor market programs seem to have a non-linear, signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁring
costs.
At the end, we would like to stress several limiting factors that should be considered in the
interpretation of our results and could be considered in future work. First, the size of search
frictions might also vary signiﬁcantly across countries which would bias our results. Second, we
assumed that the values of deep parameters are identical across countries. More evidence on those
parameters would also increase the accuracy of our results. Finally, one might think of introducing
hours and time-varying hiring costs (parameter c).
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